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John Harrison 
 
From Competitive Regions to Competitive City-
Regions: A New Orthodoxy, But Some Old 
Mistakes 
 
                            
“Will we witness the emergence of the ‘city-region’ as the future arena for 
partnership, capacity building and intervention on planning matters?” 
Tewdwr-Jones and McNeill (2000: 120) 
 
1 Introduction: the rise of the city-region 
 For many, globalisation is the relentless force that has come to 
characterise and shape the capitalist state in which our daily lives operate. At 
one level, the complex web of flows and processes spawned by globalising 
forces appear to have homogenised practice across an increasingly 
borderless world. Much less evident in the prevailing discourse, but surely of 
equal importance and practical significance, has been a new regionalism that 
is countering this notion of the world as a borderless space of flows. Not to be 
viewed as the antithesis of globalisation, the new regionalism represents the 
conceptual belief that while some flows and processes are becoming 
increasingly distanced from the confines of place, a range of counteracting 
flows and processes are increasingly rooted in a series of place-sensitive 
nodes of dense economic and social activity.   
Much documented in the new regionalist literature, the point of 
departure from this well-rehearsed debate is the observation that the 
emergence of the new regionalism appears to coincide with the resurgence of 
another territorial form, that of the city. In what remains the most 
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comprehensive account documenting the rise to prominence of city-regions in 
the global economy, Allen Scott’s book Global City-Regions i argues how, 
when presented together, “city regions are coming to function as the basic 
motors of the global economy, a proposition that points as a corollary to the 
further important notion that globalisation and city-region development are but 
two facets of a single integrated reality” (Scott, 2001: 4). 
 Current interest in the scale of the city-region marks a new stage in the 
rapidly intensifying debates about the rise of regional states of political-
economic governance, organised and aligned around a series of globally 
interlinked city-based economiesii
Under the titles of ‘global city-regions’ (Scott, 2001) and the new ‘city 
regionalism’ (Ward and Jonas, 2004), there has been a growing support for a 
resurgence of city-regions within economic geography. Moving away from 
new regionalist accounts claiming that contemporary capitalism and its 
territorial configuration were best regulated and governed in and through the 
. More than just new politically-orchestrated 
territorial forms, these new city-oriented regional states have grown to 
prominence in strategically developing and shaping the course of the new 
capitalist world economy. The ascendancy of city-regions as territorial 
platforms for leading edge developments in the contemporary capitalist 
economy has led some to identify their existence as evidence of ‘global city-
centric capitalism’ (Brenner, 1998), while the renaissance of city-regionalism 
could also be seen to constitute a new and distinctive postnational phase in 
the territorial development of capitalism. Not until recently, however, have 
debates sought to grasp the initiative to make explicit the connections 
between resurgent cities and the new regionalism (Ward and Jonas, 2004). 
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decentralisation of socioeconomic decision-making and associated policy 
implementation to regional institutional frameworks and supports, it is now 
city-regions that are seen to “function as territorial platforms for much of the 
post-Fordist economy that constitutes the dominant leading edge of 
contemporary capitalist development, and as an important staging post for the 
operation of multinational corporations” (Scott, 2001: 4).   
In contrast to the overwhelming plethora of accounts that now support 
the rise of the city-region concept (for a flavour see Hall and Pain, 2006; Lloyd 
and Peel; 2006; Parr, 2005; Scott, 2001; Ward and Jonas, 2004), this paper 
reflects on the experiences of the new regionalism to offer some sobering 
reflections on the ascent to orthodoxy of the new city-regionalism within 
economic geography. Many tensions emerged from within the new regionalist 
literature, variously documented across the breadth of political and economic 
geography, but for the purposes of this paper I will concentrate on the 
critiques provided by Lovering (1999), MacLeod (2001b), and Harrison 
(2006b). Despite offering contrasting views on the move beyond the new 
regionalism, these papers are important given that they retain a commonality 
and a consensus with regards to a series of critical weaknesses identified in 
the new regionalism. More importantly, this paper argues that these 
weaknesses have important connotations for the new city-regionalism, and 
raise important questions for the future of economic geography more broadly. 
While sympathetic to the general tenor of the new city-regionalism, this 
paper argues for a more synthetic approach to understanding the significance 
of the city-region as an effective arena for positioning economic governance. 
It argues that the current level of focus and attention that is afforded by both 
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academic and policy communities to the city-region in political-economic 
debates is at best premature and, at worst, overblown. As economic 
geographers we are frantically trying to keep afloat in the midst of the diversity 
of papers flooding into the literature to capture the evolving landscape of 
ideas and practices within the ‘pot-pourri’ of different dimensions that reflect 
the “real politik of political, institutional, governance, public policy, economic, 
social, environmental, physical, and cultural dimensions” that are our city-
regions (Lloyd and Peel, 2006: 285). As such, this paper advocates a period 
of critical theoretical and empirical interrogation, rather than what has become 
the customary race to find the next new orthodoxy (in this case the new city 
regionalism), adopt it with great haste, and bombard economic journals and 
books with supportive and mutually reinforcing commentaries. 
Like the new regionalism that preceded it, the orthodoxy surrounding 
the new city-regionalism in economic development is particularly important 
given its support by academics, political leaders, and practitioners (compare 
Hall and Pain, 2006; HM Treasury et al., 2006; Jones et al., 2006a; NLGN, 
2005; ODPM, 2004; Scott, 2001; Ward and Jonas, 2004). Similarly, the new 
city-regionalism and its impacts are particularly evident in recent political 
praxis in England. Originally part of the new regionalist inspired agenda of 
devolution and constitutional change in the United Kingdom, England (and her 
eight regions) reflect the sole territorial space(s) within the kingdom that 
operate(s) without an adequate set of subnational institutional arrangementsiii. 
In contrast to the institutions devolved to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland 
and London, and despite the creation of Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs) and Regional Assemblies (RAs) alongside the existing Government 
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Offices for the Regions (GORs), the English regions remained without a fully 
democratic tier of regional governance. 
Spurred on by the wave of optimism surrounding the creation of a 
Parliament in Scotland, a National Assembly in Wales, and a new city-wide 
authority with elected mayor in London, England was granted the opportunity 
to ascend to a fully-fledged new regionalist tier of regional governance 
through proposals to create directly-elected regional assembly’s (ERA) 
(DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002). However, an apathetic nature towards 
regionalism in England, and the landslide rejection of the governments 
proposals for an ERA in the North East Regional Referendum (November 
2004), dealt a powerful body blow to England’s New Regional Policy (NRP) 
(Harrison, 2006a). So as the door apparently closed on Labour’s new 
regionalist project in Englandiv
Following discussion of the new regionalist thinking and its various 
weaknesses (section 2), this paper provides a case-study of the current 
restructuring of economic development in England through the regulatory 
frameworks being established as part of the emerging city-regional agenda 
(section 3). Since the progressive institutionalisation of regions began to 
splutter and stall in the wake of the landslide rejection of the proposed 
centrepiece of the governments NRP, the city-region became an increasingly 
, the door to enable the rise of the city-region 
concept in the polity of England’s subnational governance became wedged 
firmly open. Through a reflective commentary of the experiences of the new 
regionalism, this paper argues that blending theoretical conceptualisation with 
grounded empirical evidence can offer new understandings on the new city-
regionalism in economic geography. 
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important arena for the concentration of academic and political interest in the 
quest to embrace the hegemonic discourse of regional competitiveness 
(Bristow, 2005). What remains unexplored to date, however, are the political-
economic implications of such a sudden territorial and scalar shift in the 
positioning of the regional competitiveness discourse from an agenda 
explicitly couched in the new regionalist idea of competitive regions to a new 
city-regionalist inspired notion of competitive city-regions.  
With the identified weaknesses from the new regionalism fresh in our 
minds, this paper critically evaluates the degree to which the new city-region 
orthodoxy that is blossoming in the economic geography literature, and the 
associated processes of city-regionalism that are being observed in the policy 
and strategy development of capitalist economies, have taken heed of the 
lessons that are to be learnt from the experiences of the new regionalism. 
Finally, this paper speculates on the wider implications that this has for the 
pursuit of truly critical economic geography in the future. 
 
2 From new regionalism to new city-regionalism 
 If the new regionalist zenith was achieved with the publication of 
Storper’s The Regional World (1997), Scott’s Regions and the World 
Economy (1998), Keating’s New Regionalism in Western Europe (1998), and 
Cooke and Morgan’s The Associational Economy (1998), then it can be 
argued that the new regionalism reached its nadir a year later with the 
publication of Lovering’s (1999) evocative critique, Theory Led by Policy: The 
Inadequacies of the New Regionalism. Although the merits of Lovering’s 
approach to critique have long been debated – this line of criticism was not 
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new, for Lovering (1995) previously attacked the new localism from a similar 
position, and indeed, he has recently taken forward this critical stance in a 
disparaging attack on post cultural-turn economic geography (Lovering, 2006) 
– there were clearly pertinent issues raised in his paper that had been 
(un)knowingly swept under the proverbial carpet by authors rushing to 
endorse this new regionalist orthodoxy.  
To begin, Lovering argues that the new regionalism is characterised by 
four key features: it is a highly selective amalgam of ‘all things good’ in the 
regional economies of the world today; new regionalist case-studies tell an 
‘attractive and persuasive story’ based on carefully selected exemplar 
regions; it has emerged as a fashionable banner offering both a convincing 
theoretical explanation and for its followers the best approach to policy 
formation; and, related to the above points, the conclusion is made that “the 
policy tail is wagging the analytical dog and wagging it so hard that indeed 
much of the theory is shaken out” (Lovering, 1999: 390). For Lovering, the 
new regionalism is simply “a set of stories about how parts of a regional 
economy might work, placed next to a set of policy ideals which might just be 
useful in some cases” (Lovering, 1999: 384 original emphasis). 
Though much cited by academics – and variously labelled as 
‘imaginative and rousing’, ‘highly provocative’, ‘deeply contentious’ (MacLeod, 
2001b), a ‘piercing academic critique’ (Jones, 2001), and a ‘hard-edge and 
negative critique’ (Harrison, 2006b) – it remains noticeable how Lovering’s 
critique of the new regionalism attracted little response from the very authors 
that were responsible for its ascent to orthodoxy within economic geography, 
and to whom Lovering’s angst was directed. Despite this timely intervention, it 
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has been argued that Lovering was unable to provide the necessary 
theoretical and conceptual tools to move beyond what he identified as the 
chaos and irrational logic behind the new regionalism (MacLeod, 2001b; 
Harrison, 2001b). As such, this author concurs with the view that Lovering’s 
(1999) critique “is essential for getting the new regionalism in perspective” 
(Jones, 2001: 1190), but that this ‘perspective’ needed enlightening through 
further work that sought to posit the theoretical and conceptual tools required 
to move beyond the new regionalism and its inadequacies.  
Responding directly to Lovering, MacLeod’s (2001b: 805) more 
considered critique sought to offer some “sobering reflections on what might 
be recovered” to partially rescue the new regionalism from its inherent lines of 
weakness. While sympathetic to the general tenor of Lovering’s critique, 
MacLeod’s more pragmatic synopsis for moving beyond the new regionalism 
made the case for a theoretical reconstruction of the new regionalism through 
a ‘geopolitically sensitive regional research agenda’ that pays particular 
attention to the restructuring of the state (MacLeod, 2001b). Firmly rooted in 
the tradition of the Regulation Approach, MacLeod’s argument that the 
important multifarious processes that are intertwined with economic 
globalisation and the purported resurgence of cities and regions are “throwing 
down some fundamental challenges” for our conceptual understandings of the 
national state, was critical in providing one particular avenue of research that 
moves beyond the new regionalism in economic geography (MacLeod, 
2001b: 806). 
Developed in light of this new regionalist debate, an alternative 
approach to MacLeod’s theoretical reconstruction of the new regionalism was 
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recently forwarded. Arguing that MacLeod’s reconstruction was too narrowly 
focused on a theoretical reconstruction of the new regionalism – one that was 
not sensitive to the actual practicalities of ‘doing’ regional regulation – this 
alternative reconstruction of the new regionalism outlined a new 
methodological framework to blend the theoretical with the empirical; through 
a multi-dimensional and multiscalar, empirically grounded, single-region case 
study approach that opens up new possibilities for gaining deeper readings of 
the complex form, function, and character of regions, and the dynamic 
processes which shape them (Harrison, 2006b). It is this notion of empirically 
thick, yet theoretically grounded research that I want to deploy here to take 
forward debates surrounding the ascent to orthodoxy of the new city-
regionalism in economic geography. 
Shaped by different motivational agendas in the move beyond the new 
regionalism, what is often overlooked is how these papers retain a certain 
degree of commonality and consensus with regards to a series of critical 
weaknesses identified within the new regionalism. Firstly, by bundling 
together too many diverse theories for it to be considered a coherent body of 
work, the chaotic nature of the new regionalism has served to distance 
political-economic geographers from explicitly engaging with their ‘supposedly 
foundational concept’ (Lovering, 1999). To be sure, the region remains an 
‘object of mystery’ within economic geography (Harrison, 2006b). Secondly, 
the new regionalism is “a poor framework through which to grasp the real 
connections between the regionalisation of business and governance and the 
changing role of the state” (Lovering, 1999: 391), which “barring a few 
exceptions…has either disregarded the changing role of the state or implied 
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that, amid the current round of globalisation-regionalisation, it is inevitably in 
terminal decline” (MacLeod, 2001b: 806).  
Related to this absence of the state in much of the new regionalist 
literature, a third concern has centred on how the new regionalism has 
become enmeshed in multifaceted scalar politics and associated tangled 
policy hierarchies (Harrison, 2006b). Building on MacLeod’s (2001a; 2001b) 
analysis of ‘thin political economy’ in the new regionalism, and the 
requirement to explicitly focus on the role played by the state in the remaking 
of both regional economies and their structures of governance, there is a 
broader obligation upon economic geographers to examine the increased 
complexity in the way that the state produces, reproduces, and articulates the 
scalar and spatial sites of economic governance (Brenner, 2004).  
Reinforcing these first three weaknesses, a fourth concern has 
developed from Lovering’s (1999) catchy metaphor, ‘the policy tail is wagging 
the analytical dog’, which focuses on the dangers of soft institutionalism and 
programmes of policy transfer. Sceptical of imported policy solutions, the new 
regionalism was, somewhat paradoxically, drawn to favour those policy 
measures that are informed by the perceived commonalities found in the 
development of prosperous regions. While some regulatory institutions may in 
a structural sense be replicated elsewhere, their operation and effects most 
certainly cannot be repeated. Of all the weaknesses, this paradox endangered 
the new regionalism the most because while institutions do have effects, there 
can be no absolute guarantees as to their effects; regional policies designed 
to imitate growth regions cannot account for the effects of state regulation; the 
effects of institutions are guided by a set of unique local conditions; and, the 
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time-lag between the creation of institutions in successful and less favoured 
regions cannot be accounted for (Harrison, 2006b). Indeed, as the events 
surrounding the collapse of the NRP in England have highlighted, these 
inherent lines of weakness within the new regionalism have had major 
repercussions for the state restructuring of subnational economic governance 
(Harrison, 2006a). The question that remains unanswered in the current race 
to adopt the new city-regionalism, however, is whether these same 
weaknesses that undermined the new regionalist programme of economic 
governance, will similarly undermine the new city-regional agenda that is 
sweeping through economic geography? It is to this question that this paper 
now turns, through an empirically supported reading of the new city-
regionalism. 
 
3 The Rise of the City-Region Concept in England 
The recent (re-)emergence of city-regions in the spatial governance of 
England has been the result of a key focus within political-economic debates 
over the differences between economic and administrative boundaries, and 
how subnational organisations and institutions – ranging from the community 
to the region – could contribute further to localised economic development. 
Over the past twenty-five years these debates have seen a three-phase shift 
in the focus of state projects at the subnational level. Firstly, economic 
development policies from the 1980s onwards saw the arrival of various 
public-private partnership policy measures that were established as 
alternatives to direct local government intervention at the scale of the city – 
Urban Development Corporations (1980), City Challenge (1991) and the 
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Single Regeneration Budget (1994). Derived from the fallout from UDCs and 
City Challenge, and the transfer of SRB to the newly established GORs, the 
second phase concentrated on the recognition that the public-private 
partnerships, which had been characteristic of the urban-local scale in phase 
one, were now being replicated at the regional level in the mid-1990s. The 
new requirement for  strategic planning at the regional level at this time 
renewed debate surrounding the periodic problem facing England; an 
overheating economy in the Greater South East and underperforming 
economies in the North of England (Peck and Tickell, 1995). 
With continued economic growth over the last decade, Blair’s Labour 
Government recognised that the rapid expansion of London and the South 
East was outgrowing the regional housing and transport infrastructure. Thus, 
contained within Labour’s programme of devolution and constitutional that 
afforded the English regions with RDAs and indirectly-elected RAs, the 
settlement for London had its origins in the notion of competitive city-
regionalism. Led by an elected Mayor (Ken Livingstonev), the new Greater 
London Authority represented the formal collaboration of public-private 
partnership working at the level of the city-region in order to provide a 
territorially institutionalised platform from which to secure London and the 
South East’s position in the global economy. Indeed, it was at this time that 
academics and policy practitioners began to question whether we were 
witnessing the emergence of the city-region as the future arena for 
intervention in the political and economic regulation of the state (Tewdwr-
Jones and McNeill, 2000). 
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With disparities between the Greater South East and the peripheral 
regions of England continuing to spiral out of control under Blair’s Labour 
government, there appeared to be a number of possible solutions to 
accommodate the high levels of growth in and around London: restrict growth 
and slow the over heating of the South East; create new investment in the 
lagging regions (especially in northern England); or, spatially intervene and 
manage the physical location of industry through programmes of relocation 
out of the South East. Outlined in Sustainable Communities: Building for the 
Future (SCP) (ODPM, 2003), the governments proposals for the strategic 
regional planning of England made for interesting reading. 
Launched in February 2003 by the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) John 
Prescott, the Sustainable Communities Plan (SCP) outlined the governments 
£22bn commitment to accommodate the economic success of the Greater 
South East through a demand-side programme spatially concentrated on the 
development of four growth areas located in what is known as the South East 
mega-city region (Hall and Pain, 2006)vi
In the midst of the political fallout from the SCP, government ministers 
moved swiftly to open up a new ‘Northern Way’ programme – Making it 
Happen: The Northern Way (ODPM, 2004) – to bring Northern England 
. Published eighteen months before 
the collapse of the NRP in England, the government’s political allies in the 
north were distinctly under-whelmed by the state’s decision to focus policies 
towards accommodating growth in the South East, rather than addressing 
spatial inequalities across England. Some commentators went so far as to 
suggest that the government’s policy was like ‘a slap in the face for many in 
the North’ (Robson, 2004). 
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forward in the economic development and spatial planning of England. In its 
infancy the Northern Way was based on a spatial growth corridor that ran 
west-east from Liverpool to Hull, and a secondary north-south corridor 
connecting Newcastle and Leeds. Despite speculation from sceptics that the 
exercise was largely ‘cobbled together’ by Prescott’s advisors and civil 
servants in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, at the programme’s 
launch in Manchester, the DPM remained resolute in his belief that the 
Northern Way would “provide the framework for growth that can match the 
growth corridors of the Thames Gateway” (Prescott quoted in ODPM, 2004: 
1). 
Irrespective of the lack of substance that lay behind the glossy front 
cover – the sole funding support for the programme came from a £100m 
growth fund – and the ready acknowledgement that the programme 
conveniently filled the political void left by the SCP, the Northern Way 
received enthusiastic overtures from political leaders and commentators 
within the North of England: 
 
“This was an initiative which appeared out of nowhere and which, at 
the time, seemed to amount to little more than a sound bite designed 
for media consumption. But it may turn out that the Northern Way could 
end up being one of the most significant initiatives in regional economic 
policy for a number of years.” 
Adamsvii (2004: 1) 
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So how did a project that was ‘willing the ends but not providing the 
means’ (Hetherington, 2004) potentially become one of the most significant 
initiatives in the economic governance of the English regions? Somewhere 
contained within these threadbare proposals for the creation of a Northern 
Way model for spatial economic development in England, there had to be a 
political thread that resonated with the political leaders and key economic 
stakeholders of Northern England. 
Despite a lack of substance in the proposals, leaders in the north of 
England realised that without a major injection of enthusiasm and leadership 
to turn these aspirations into a fully implementable programme, the Northern 
Way project would fall by the political wayside. Dubbed “a once in a lifetime 
opportunity for the North of England to shape its own destiny by bringing 
about change – the Northern Way” (Northern Way Steering Group, 2005: 3) 
the three northern RDAs – One North East, Northwest Development Agency, 
and Yorkshire Forward – were challenged to outline what the North should do 
differently to unlock the potential for faster economic growth and begin to 
bridge the £29bn productivity gap with the South of England. As the RDA 
taskforce began consulting the economic leaders of the northern regions, it 
became apparent that the challenge facing the taskforce mirrored that which 
had been occupying the minds of leaders in the major regional cities of 
England. 
Established in 1995, the city councils of eight regional cities in England 
– Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham 
and Sheffield – began working together to ensure that their profile compares 
favourably with the leading regional cities internationally, through the 
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development of a vision detailing the distinctive role that large cities play in 
their regional and national economy. The initial informal association was 
formalised through the establishment of England’s ‘Core Cities Group’, whose 
mission was to: 
 
“Demonstrate the role of England’s cities in increasing regional 
prosperity and narrowing the gap between English regions. Building on 
the fruitful dialogue now underway between the Core Cities, 
Government Departments and Regional Development Agencies, and 
following the example set by successful European cities, there is a 
need to develop positive policy and practical measures at local, 
regional and national levels to specifically address the performance 
gap between English regions, and to help cities fulfil their economic 
potential.”  
Core Cities Mission Statement 
 
 While both were championed by the same government department 
(ODPM), and the territorial politics of both can be seen as a spatial-political 
response to uneven development (i.e. the perception of disparity between the 
South East and the remainder of England), what became increasingly 
noticeable was that the Core Cities Group and the RDAs were working at 
different scales – the city and region respectively – towards a solution to the 
same economic challenge. With political debate concentrated on the political 
progression of the NRP in 2003-04, the city-regional agenda was slowly 
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bubbling away under the surface through the work of the RDA-led taskforce 
and the Core Cities Group (ODPM, 2003; Core Cities Group, 2004). 
Ironically, it was on the campaign trail for the regional referendum on 
ERAs that the DPM brought together the twin-tracks of the broader regional 
dimension – the constitutional, through the limited political devolution to the 
regions, and the economy, through the work of the RDAs and their links with 
HM Treasury, ODPM, and the Department of Trade and Industry (Tomaney 
and Hetherington, 2004) – to pave the way for a new English city-regionalism.  
Combining the efforts of the northern RDAs and the Core Cities Group, 
the re-launch of the revitalised ‘Northern Way’ programme – Moving Forward: 
The Northern Way (NWSG, 2004) – eradicated the memory of growth 
corridors and marked the first indication that competitive city-regionalism was 
now firmly on the government agenda. A matter of a few months later, with 
the landslide rejection of the governments proposals for ERAs effectively 
closing the door on the new regionalist policy in England for the foreseeable 
future, the door for the new city-regionalism to replace the new regionalism as 
the orthodoxy in economic geography, and the city-region to replace the 
region as the territorial focal point for subnational economic governance was 
firmly open. Illustrative of this, a paradigmatic shift could also be observed in 
the policy discourse emanating from the state at this time: 
 
“We recognise the need to evolve our approach further to ensure that 
regional and local institutions have the capability, capacity and 
confidence to overcome regional economic disparities. Increasing 
institutional flexibility around targets, funding and central guidance, tied 
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to stronger accountabilities and performance incentives, will help 
national, regional and local institutions work better together. The 
Regional Development Agencies, in particular, have an excellent 
understanding of what is needed to drive economic growth in the 
regions.” 
 
Devolving Decision Making: 2 – Meeting the Regional Economic 
Challenge: Increasing Regional and Local Flexibility 
HM Treasury et al. (2004: foreword) 
 
“Cities represent the spatial manifestations of economic activity – large, 
urban agglomerations in which businesses choose to locate in order to 
benefit from proximity to other businesses, positive spillovers and 
external economies of scale. This document sets out how successful 
cities can contribute to competitive regions, stimulating growth and 
employment, promoting excellence in surrounding areas and joining up 
separate business hubs to expand existing markets and create new 
ones…This document extends the analysis and understanding of the 
economic role of cities and regions in lifting regional and national 
growth, and tackling disparities between places. It examines the drivers 
of, and constraints on, the economic performance of cities. It identifies 
the policy challenge in enabling English cities to build on recent 
economic growth, improve economic performance and catch up to 
international counterparts.” 
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Devolving Decision Making: 3 – Meeting the Regional Economic 
Challenge: The Importance of Cities to Regional Growth 
HM Treasury et al. (2006: 1) 
 
Discussion around the rise to prominence of the city-region for 
unlocking economic growth has gathered further momentum within the 
corridors of Westminster and Whitehall through the proliferation of 
government think-tanks and leading political figures adding their backing to 
the idea of competitive city-regionalism (Jones et al., 2006a; Kelly, 2006; 
Marshall and Finch, 2006; NLGN, 2005; Marvin et al., 2006; SURF, 2004). 
Even at this early stage, the city-region agenda in England has developed so 
that relational processes and trans-regional networked forms of governance 
are being opened up to fresh approaches across both territorial space and 
scale. Responding in kind to the development of the Northern Way, regions 
lying outside the remit of this trans-regional and relationally networked 
programme have moved swiftly to develop and formalise their own strategic 
plans. With the South East benefiting from the SCP and Northern England 
from the Northern Way, the East and West Midland regions believed that they 
“had been left to fend for themselves in a no-man’s land of regional policy” 
(TCPA, 2005). Not wishing to ‘miss out’, the Midland regions produced their 
very own growth strategy – Smart Growth: The Midlands Way (AWM/EMDA, 
2005). Subsequent to this, the South West region has moved to develop The 
Way Ahead: Delivering Sustainable Communities for the South West, and in 
the East of England a new Regional Cities East organisation has been 
establishedviii. Together, these  policy developments could be seen as 
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“amounting to a trans-regional and relationally networked embryonic national 
spatial plan” for England (Jones et al., 2006b: 14). What remains unanswered, 
however, is whether the same weaknesses that undermined the new 
regionalism have been collapsed into the new city-regional agenda. 
Supported by further empirical evidence from the political praxis currently 
operating in England, it is to this question that the final part of this paper 
explores. 
 
4 The New City Regionalism: New Orthodoxy, Same Old Mistakes?  
Such a dramatic shift in the policy rhetoric of the British state from 
‘regions’ in 2004 to a new discourse of ‘cities and regions’ by 2006 raises a 
number of questions, through which it is argued can provide the opening for a 
much needed critical appraisal of the position of orthodoxy afforded to the 
new city-regionalism within economic geography, its cognate disciplines, and 
political praxis. This section questions whether the new city-regionalism has 
rescaled rather than resolved the problems by collapsing the weaknesses 
identified in the new regionalism into the new city-regionalism. 
 
4.1 City Regions: Objects of Mystery 
In recent history the roots of the city-region concept can be traced to a 
series of sporadic yet seminal works that appeared throughout the twentieth 
century (Fawcett, 1919; Dickinson, 1964; 1967; Hall et al., 1973). Each in their 
time brought the city-region to the forefront of academic and political debate, 
but it is the work of Dickinson that provides the conceptual framework from 
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which the most recent analysis of the city-region concept takes as its starting 
point. 
Following an initial flurry of excitement surrounding city-regions in the 
late 1960s, the city-region concept reached the apex of it its academic and 
policy attention in the mid-1970s (Hall et al., 1973), from which it then began a 
slow and steady decline into its relative obscurity during the 1980s. What 
appears here to be nothing more than a simple historical tale of the rise and 
fall of the city-region concept (1960-1980) actually contains important links to 
the current debate surrounding the transition from regions to city-regions. 
Scholars are ready to acknowledge Dickinson (1967) by way of a cursory 
reference in their opening remarks to new city-regional commentaries (Lloyd 
and Peel, 2006; Parr, 2005), but few, if any, stay around long enough to make 
the important links between Dickinson’s seminal work on city-regions and its 
application to contemporary discussions. Here it is argued that too much 
haste has prevented critical reflective thinking and obscured further 
understanding of city-region programmes operating in political praxis. 
Remembering the important transition from competitive regions to 
competitive city-regions in the evolving economic geography of the present 
day, it is particularly revealing to look beyond the narrow focus that many 
scholars adopt when highlighting Dickinson’s seminal works on city-regions. 
Ironically, in the period of decline for the city-region concept in the 1970s, it 
was Dickinson himself who coined the phrase ‘the regional concept’, to 
promote the centrality of ‘the region’ to the theory and practice of human 
geography and its cognate disciplines (Dickinson, 1976). Often overlooked, 
back in the 1970s Dickinson’s leap from the retreating conceptual orthodoxy 
 22 
of the city-region, to the new and rising regional orthodoxy that produced the 
new regional geography of the 1980s, and subsequently the new regionalism 
of the 1990s, offers a striking resemblance to the reversal in orthodoxy 
between regions and city-regions observed presently. 
Despite this revitalisation of the ‘regional concept’ over recent decades, 
what remained constant throughout, is that the region remained ‘an object of 
mystery’, with an unqualified definition of what a region actually is (Harrison, 
2006b). And herein lies the second valuable insight provided by Dickinson. If 
for one moment we reflect upon the essence of Dickinson’s conceptualisation 
of city-regions, striking similarities emerge between this and the much citied 
work of Allen et al. (1998) on the social construction of regions: 
 
“This concept of the city-region, like all concepts, is a mental construct. 
It is not, as some planners and scholars seem to think, an area that is 
presented on a platter to suit their general needs. The extent of the 
area they need will depend on specific purpose for which it is required. 
The concept of the city-region can only be made specific and definable, 
as a geographic entity, by reference to the precise and areal extent of 
particular associations with the city.” 
Dickinson (1964: 227) 
 
“Regional studies are always done for a purpose, with a specific view. 
Whether territorial, political, cultural or whatever, there is always a 
specific focus. One cannot study everything, and there are always 
multiple ways of seeing a place: there is no complete ‘portrait of a 
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region’. Moreover, ‘regions’ only exist in relation to particular criteria. 
They are not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, they are our (and 
others’) constructions.” 
Allen et al. (1998: 2) 
 
 Though written over two decades apart, clear parallels emerge 
between the conceptualisation of the city-region in the 1970s and the region in 
the 1990s: specifically, there are multiple ways of seeing each place; they 
exist in relation to particular associations/criteria; and they are always socially 
constructed. So what does this mean for the re-emergence of city-regions 
presently? 
In the midst of the new regionalist orthodoxy, it was only a decade ago 
that Storper (1997) famously suggested that we were living in a ‘regional 
world’ where regions were the fundamental building blocks for a globally 
interconnected capitalist state. Today, the new regionalism is no longer the 
fashionable banner that it once was. While new regionalist approaches and 
interventions continue to inform us of how political-administrative regions are 
strategic scalar anchor points within the increasingly complex multi-level, 
multi-scaled, and multi-tiered system of economic capitalism, this very notion 
of regional space has been challenged by those who advocate a ‘relational’ 
approach to understanding and conceptualising spatiality: 
 
“If we are to see…regions as spatial formations, they must be 
summoned up as temporary placements of ever moving material and 
immanent geographies, as ‘hauntings’ of things that have moved on 
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but left their mark as situated moments in distanciated networks, as 
contoured producers of the networks that cross a given place. The sum 
is cities and regions without prescribed or proscribed boundaries.” 
Amin (2004: 34 original emphasis) 
 
“Space is no longer seen as a nested hierarchy moving from ‘global’ to 
‘local’. This absurd scale-dependent notion is replaced by the notion 
that what counts is connectivity.” 
Thrift (2004: 59 emphasis added) 
 
 What can perhaps be argued as the inherently antigeographical (and 
antipolitical) thrust of much of the current ‘relational turn’ presents a particular 
challenge for conceptualising cities, regions, and city-regions, given that 
“emerging spatial configurations are not necessarily or purposively territorial 
or scalar but are constituted through the spatiality of flow, porosity, and 
connectivity” (Jones et al., 2006b: 3). Striking in its appearance, it is clear that 
the territorial emphasis for subnational economic governance in political 
praxis (HM Treasury et al., 2004; 2006), has run parallel to these theoretical 
debates within economic geography. With England’s NRP very much at the 
forefront of the political agenda in 2004, the policy discourse deployed by the 
state focused explicitly on the role played by political-administrative regions in 
securing competitive advantage in the global economy, whereas following the 
collapse of the NRP in late 2004, a new ‘relational’ policy discourse that 
focuses on cities and regions emerged in the equivalent government 
document from 2006 (see Section 3). 
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 My argument here is that while new regionalist scholars struggled to 
grapple with their foundational concept, such that the region has remained an 
‘object of mystery’, the same challenge is now a centrally embedded 
component of debates surrounding the emergence of a new city-regionalism; 
notably, what it a city-region? Similar to current debates within planning on 
spatial strategy making and ‘spatial planning and governance’, city-regions as 
a new set of ideas and agendas, politically, almost defy theoretical constructs 
since they are fluid, diverse and characterised by difference. Links between 
the social construction of city and regional space, and the concept of 
relational space, are thus critical for understanding the dynamics and 
institutionalisation of city-regions as we constantly move beyond singularly 
fixed, territorially bounded concepts of space. Though my purpose here is not 
to provide a taxonomy on city-regions, given that the city-region is the new 
and emerging subnational scalar focal point and territorial fix for the global 
capitalist economy, a critical reappraisal of the city-region concept is clearly 
one of the most urgent tasks facing economic geographers today. On this, 
city-region planning in England points towards a polity that lacks uniformity. 
Driven forward by the RDAs and the Core Cities Group it is noticeable that of 
the eight component city-regions of the Northern Way, only five – Liverpool, 
Manchester, Newcastle, Leeds and Sheffield – are based upon cities that 
form part of the Core Cities Group, with Central Lancashire, Tees Valley, and 
Hull & the Humber ports a result of regional and national political fiat. Indeed 
the latest of these city-region strategies – Regional Cities East – is based 
upon six medium-sized provincial towns/cities, thus not containing any core 
city within its bounds. As such, the new city-regionalism does not constitute 
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an internally consistent approach to the city-region in the academic literature, 
or the policy agenda of nation-states. Nor, for that matter, can the new city-
regionalism be considered to refer to a single set of uniform processes 
operating both internally within, and externally across, city-regions. For sure, 
the challenge for economic geographers remains – to study emerging state 
spaces (such as city regions) and position them within an increasingly 
complex territorial, networked, and relational world. With this in mind, the 
second avenue for critical engagement is to explore the relationship between 
the city-region and the state. 
 
4.2 City-Regions and State Politics 
If, as we have discovered, the city-region is a slippery term that can be 
best described by what it is not, then understanding its function within national 
social formations becomes increasingly important. Perusing through the 
various literatures though, one could often be forgiven for thinking that the 
state had even less of a role in the new city-regionalism than it did previously 
in the new regionalism. Drawing comparisons with Storper’s (1997) notion that 
we are living in a ‘regional world’, comprised of regional economies that are 
the building blocks for a networked and interconnected global state, according 
to more recent contributions, the increasing territorial interconnectivity 
between city-regions – to form what some have termed an archipelago 
economy (Veltz, 1996) – will often bypass the national-state (Taylor et al., 
2002). Once too often though, this notion of bypassing the national-state has 
led to misinformed articulations rendering the state less important within the 
global matrix of subnational economic units that are increasingly viewed as 
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the necessary scalar fix for maintaining competitiveness (Ohmae, 1995; 
2001). It is argued that the political-economic impacts of globalisation, such 
that city-regions are coming to function as the basic motors of the global 
economy, has had marked effects on the authority of even the most powerful 
territorial states today (Scott et al., 2001). Thus, the new city-regionalism is 
seen by many to challenge the ideals and practices of citizenship, political 
representation, and democracy that have been bound up with the 
achievement of statehood as economic, cultural, social, and informational 
flows permeate and straddle the boundaries and territory of individual nation-
states. 
With the geographic structure of these relationally-networked city-
regions tending “more and more to override purely political boundaries so that 
they are increasingly free from regulatory supervision on the part of national 
states” (Scott, 2001: 4) striking a chord with scalar debates that are 
demonstrating a stronger horizontal networking of territorial space – over and 
above the purely hierarchical ordering of scales from the global to the local – it 
is exactly this spatial transfiguration that reinforces the importance of the 
relationship between city-regions and the state. Though it can be argued that 
the new city-regionalism is “not so much an initiative flowing out from central 
government as it is a direct local response to stresses and strains set in 
motion by the emergence of the city-region as an important actor in the world 
economy” (Scott et al., 2001: 21), it is questionable whether this can justify 
claims that undermine the importance of the state, and the importance of 
understanding the state’s role in shaping subnational territorial spaces. 
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If the emergence of the new city-regionalism has challenged the 
authority of the state and made it even less important than it was previously 
seen to be throughout the period of new regionalist orthodoxy, then it would 
be easy to assume that the new city-regional agenda has, by default, partially 
overcome the accusation of being a poor framework through which to grasp 
the real connections between the regionalisation of business and governance 
and the changing role of the state. As in the new regionalism, where the state 
was the critical enabler of subnational economic restructuring – illustrated in 
the ascent, and subsequent demise, of the NRP in England (see Harrison, 
2006a) – recognition of the evolving form of the state is critical for 
understanding city-regional development.  
Of course, it should not be assumed that city-regions have replaced or 
flanked nation-states, nor that they have become detached from their 
respective nation-stateix. More modestly, but no less importantly, the form and 
function of city-regions remain intimately tied into the evolution of new state 
formations. Once more, a perspective on this can be achieved through 
reference to the work of Dickinson, because the city-regionalism that he 
observed in the 1960s served a very different function – redistribution – during 
the era of Keynesian macro-economic management, compared to the 
neoliberal development agenda of economic growth and competitiveness that 
city-regions service today. Indeed for me, the recognition that the re-
configuration of the state is becoming increasingly complex makes it even 
more critical than it was in the new regionalism to understand the complex 
restructuring of the state in governing new regional economic state spaces. 
Furthermore, it is believed that the politics surrounding the new city-
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regionalism in England can enlighten the need for critical reflection on the role 
of the state within reconstituted postnational capitalist space economies. 
“Nothing less than the transformation of the North of England” was the 
vision that heralded the arrival of the Northern Way (NWSG, 2005: 6). Yet a 
strategy is not merely the sum of the activities that it proposes to undertake, 
because without resources, authority, and power these projects will remain in 
existence purely in pen and ink. Thus, the meagre £100 million growth fund 
earmarked for the Northern Way represents a rather paltry sum in comparison 
to the transformational agenda that it is to charged with delivering uponx, and 
even more so when you break down this investment to realise that £50m of 
this growth fund has been contributed by the three northern RDAs. Any 
intention on behalf of the government to make further contributions, as had 
been speculated upon in the initial development of the Northern Way, have 
now been firmly blocked by the state. The future of the Northern Way now lies 
entirely with the three northern RDAs, given that for it to continue post-2008 
when they will have committed the majority of their growth fund, the RDAs will 
have to fund the entire programme from within their own state-derived budget. 
More generally, the £50m state contribution to the Northern Way pales into 
insignificance when compared to the £22bn commitment made by the same 
government a year earlier in the design for spatial growth in the Greater South 
East region (ODPM, 2003). Entirely consistent with the European Union’s 
‘balanced competitiveness’ agenda, this approach aims to bring up lagging 
cities/regions to a common standard without damaging the position of the 
leading cities/regions; and critically, it avoids the thorny political issue of 
addressing regional disparities that result from uneven development. 
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Arguing that “the distinctive aspect of the role of resurgent cities in the 
new regionalism…is the departure from explanations that emphasise the 
importance of cities and regions within social redistributional national policy 
and political frameworks” (Ward and Jonas, 2004: 2121) these proponents of 
the new city-regionalism have a clear understanding of the need to remind 
readers that the national state continues to be the de facto animator of 
regional development. True, city-regions do seek to obtain partial territorial 
autonomy from the state and a degree of independent authority over local 
economic decision-making, but this should not be read as an attempt to 
replace or operate at a tangent to the national economy. In highlighting how 
the partial control that city-regions exhibit over the overall subnational 
governance framework in England, the evidence from England reinforces the 
assertion that the state retains near exclusivity in the control of regional 
development. The role of the state in this realm has thus shifted from that of 
the driving force in the design and implementation of strategies, to that of an 
enabler, facilitator, and catalyst in the multilevel metagovernance of the 
postnational regulatory framework; in this case, through the designated 
provision of legislative frameworks to assist institutional capacity building at 
the city-region level. Key to our understanding of the rescaling process has to 
be the recognition that it is never a neutral matter (Swyngedouw, 1997; 
Morgan, 2006). In contrast, “the rescaling of state functions and the 
assembling of institutions around city-regions is seen as a deliberate 
orchestration on the part of the state to the changing geographical logic of 
capitalism, where capitalism has been transformed from a nationally 
organised space economy to a globalised space of commodities, networks, 
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and flows, within which state territorial hierarchies are collapsed through a 
process of stretching out” (Ward and Jonas, 2004: 2135). To this end, 
uncovering the role of the state in orchestrating the rescaling of powers is 
important, but it does not provide all the answers. For these answers we must 
look at broader patterns of state rescaling in, across, and between other 
scales of analysis. 
 
4.3 City-Regions or State Politics 
 With remnants of the new regionalist orthodoxy retaining their presence 
in the English regions, city-regions add to an already complex and 
overcrowded political and regulatory set of frameworks. More than simply a 
need to focus on the orchestration and negotiation of responsibilities and 
competencies between city-regions and the state, complex territorial politics 
require unpacking subnationally between city-regions and regional state 
spaces (be they trans-regional, pan-regional, regional, or sub-regional). To 
this end, the new city-regionalism throws up new territorial issues, with the 
integration of the city-region with other economic units – across multiple levels 
of geographical territory and scale – the challenging agenda that necessitates 
a move towards more nuanced and textured understandings of the 
institutional role that city-regions occupy in economic policy. Once more, it is 
argued that the politics surrounding the new city-regionalism in England can 
enlighten this debate. 
 Over time there has been a long but somewhat sporadic engagement 
with policy instruments that represent the North of England, but where the 
Northern Way becomes particularly interesting in the context of this present 
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discussion, is the territorially selective engagement with place. Given that the 
North of England does not actually represent an existing political entity, and 
that the programme is not actually a strategy for the entire territory, it appears 
reticent on behalf of the state to afford the programme the title of the Northern 
Way. Even more perplexing, the state’s acknowledgement that there is a clear 
socioeconomic disparity between the north and the south in the rhetoric that 
underpins the programme – most clearly seen in the title – marks a clear shift 
in the government’s thinking (compare with Blair, 1999). Despite initially being 
reported as an initiative coming from the RDAs and pressed upon Whitehall 
(Adams, 2004), as we have noted earlier, the Northern Way is another form of 
centrally orchestrated regionalism with the state in the vanguard of enacting 
metagovernance i.e. the governance of governance. Enabled by the state in 
the first instance, it was only subsequent to this that the RDAs and Core Cities 
Group were mobilised by the state to push the agenda forward, with the 
proviso that the state retained the (almost invisible) strong hand in controlling 
and determining the direction that the programme follows.  
Developed in the same context as the failed NRP in England, the 
creation of the Northern Way is thus another illustration of ‘state-sponsored’ 
decentralisation where the central state legitimises the appropriate 
institutional fix that will occur subnationally (Tewdwr-Jones, 2006; cf. Scott, 
2001). The problem here is that what may be viewed as appropriate by the 
state, may not be considered suitable at the local or regional levels. Indeed, 
one could argue that this evidences an inherent protectionist policy on the part 
of the state to protect its stance in the face of challenging processes of 
decentralisation and globalisation. 
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Despite the government’s decision to withdraw further funding for the 
Northern Way, if the three RDAs do decide to continue funding the 
programme, the state will retain its strong hand given that they have imposed 
strict output targets upon the RDAs for the state-derived funding that they 
administer. With no new funding going into the North of England, the Northern 
Way is a clear case of rescaling rather than resolving the problems of spatial 
disparities and uneven development. For the RDAs, this is proving a 
particularly difficult balancing act given that they are now promoting an 
unbounded networked conceptualisation of regional spatiality through their 
role in driving the Northern Way, and yet their day-to-day operations are 
explicitly bounded through the political-administrative nature of regions. 
Indeed, the relationship between the Northern Way city-region’s and the RDA 
subregions in the economic geography of the north is unclear given that both 
operate at similar geographical scales and over similar territorial spaces. 
Indicative of the further entanglement of policy hierarchies, the events 
unfolding in England highlight how “competitive city-regionalism is best 
understood as an ongoing struggle for control of space rather than a new 
emergent form of capitalist territorial competition and development” (Ward and 
Jonas, 2004: 2135). In each case, the outcome has been the result of a 
centrally orchestrated regionalism that is once more illustrative of the 
importance of understanding the state’s role in the governance of subnational 
economies. In recognising the centrality of the state, the inherent danger of 
this top-down approach is the tendency that identifying a new spatial-
analytical structure will sacrifice careful examination of the causal structures 
and mechanisms that enable political-economic dividends to be accrued. A 
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headlong rush into yet another policy initiative that promises salvation to 
lagging cities and regions is therefore flirting with the inherent danger of ‘soft 
institutionalism’ (MacLeod, 2001a). 
 
4.4  Soft Institutionalism and Policy Imitation 
 Institutionalist political-economic restructuring has undoubtedly 
enriched the theoretical depth of new regionalist perspectives, and yet the 
academic and policy-induced tendency to read-off institutional developments 
from successful new regional state spaces retains an uneasy position at the 
core of their activity. Leading to the inherent dangers of ‘soft institutionalism’, 
the ascendancy to orthodoxy of the city-region as both an academic concept 
and as a policy magnet has led many of the leading competitive (and less 
competitive) cities and regions to be proactive in developing their own 
economic policies in pursuit of perceived competitive advantages from the 
institutionalisation of new systems of political-economic governance at the 
level of the city-region. Consensus that city-regions are coming to function as 
the basic motors of the global economy means that “city-regions today are 
facing enormous and unfamiliar pressures, so that they are being induced to 
search by trial and error for appropriate models of political response” (Scott, 
2001: 4-5). If territories are induced into searching for city-regional policy 
models external to them, it can also be argued that territories are induced into 
searching internally, such that: 
 
“There is a tendency to project the model of the global city-region 
elsewhere around the world, interpreting just about any manifestation 
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of territorial specificity as a response to global restructuring. This 
constructed model is then propagated and sold back to urban and 
regional leaders as a model to emulate, so creating further material for 
the original observers. One is then forced to ask how far this model is 
an interpretation of the world and how far it is a mere construction.”  
Keating (2001: 375) 
  
Once again, the emphasis placed upon ‘construction’ highlights the 
vitally important role that economic geographers have to play in 
understanding the city-region, as internal and external searches for an 
opportunity to engage in political-economic practice overtakes our critical and 
rational explanations of the new city-regionalism. 
In practice, both internal and external searches for city-region policy 
models are clearly evident in recent political praxis in England. In the 
formulation and composition of the Northern Way there was a considerable 
amount of political manoeuvring following the initial selection of the five city-
regions, based on the five core cities within the North of England – Liverpool, 
Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle. With little or no experience of 
city-region collaboration, the inclusion of the Hull & Humber port, Tees Valley, 
and Central Lancashire in the Northern Way, and the subsequent 
development of city-region development plans in other territories – for 
example, through the development of a Midlands Way – provides evidence 
that the levels of policy imitation remain constantxi and that the construction of 
city-regions is ‘done for a purpose’. Taken together, it is believed that this 
evidence adds weight to the argument that the weaknesses identified in the 
 36 
new regionalism have simply been collapsed into the new city-regionalism, 
with little or no consideration of their effects.  
 
5 Concluding comments 
Adding weight to recent arguments suggesting that “the city-region is in 
danger of becoming simply the latest in a long line of fashionable ideas” 
(Morgan, 2006: 1) this paper has sought to reinforce how in the most recent 
economic geography orthodoxies, the same weaknesses appear to 
undermine their theoretical position. As such, the new city-regionalism has 
been exposed as rescaling, rather than resolving, the weaknesses that 
signalled the fall from orthodoxy of the new regionalism. Talking up growth, 
through discourses of regional competitiveness (Bristow, 2005), and through 
the spatial and scalar reorganisation of the state from one scale to another – 
in this case from the region to the city-region – merely distracts attention away 
from the state’s inability to manage the capitalist tendency for uneven 
development. On this point, Ward and Jonas (2004) are quick to highlight in 
their critique how the new city regionalism is constructed narrowly around 
geographies of accumulation and competition, at the expense of knowledge of 
other kinds of economic geography; those of collective provision, 
consumption, labour regulation, uneven development, social regulation, and 
so forth. 
As I have tried to illustrate in this paper, the new regional policy of the 
late 1990s, and now the emerging city-regional policy within government 
today are both constructs partly of a desire on behalf of the state to find an 
appropriate scale to perform the same economic growth function. As such, the 
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displacement of the state into ‘politically mediated institutional projects’ 
(Jones, 2001) is indicative of the crisis tendencies exhibited by the state in 
maintaining its legitimacy for managing the economy; or what we have come 
to know in economic geography as the ‘crisis of crisis management’ (Offe, 
1984). With the state continuing to direct and steer social and economic 
activity in the so-called national interest questions, the role of the nation-state, 
and in particular its relationship with subnational tiers of governance, will 
continue to dominate debates surrounding the rise of the city-region (Tewdwr-
Jones, 2006).  
To understand the city-region, however, we must also recognise the 
role enacted by local and regional interests and local and regional states in 
explaining the rise of city-regionalism. For instance, England’s Core Cities 
Group is an obvious example of a subnational spatial-political response to 
uneven development and a perceived disparity between the South East 
mega-city region and the remainder of England that has helped shape city-
regionalism. However, as this paper has sought to illustrate, the capacity for 
self determination in subregional territories continues to be constrained and 
blunted by the state’s ability to direct and steer these new governance 
mechanisms towards what is perceived to be in the national interest – at the 
obvious expense of local and regional interests whose capacity to shape the 
city-region agenda is constrained by this process. In the longer term, when 
the time does come to move beyond the new city-regionalism, a more critical 
stance needs to be adopted within economic geography; such that the 
inherent lines of weakness that undermined the new regionalism, and are now 
present in the new city-regionalism, are not merely rescaled or collapsed into 
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a new orthodoxy in economic geography. The challenge that lies ahead is 
difficult, but it is one that we need to recognise as we move forward in 
economic geography. 
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i The pivotal role of Global City-Regions in the rise to orthodoxy of the new city-regionalism is 
particularly revealing given that it has its origins at the University of California, Los Angeles; 
the same institution that gave rise to the North American strand of the new regionalism in the 
mid-1990s (Storper, 1997; Scott, 1998). 
ii This notion of the world as a space of flows held together by a network of cities has been 
centred on the work of the Globalisation and World Cities Research Group (GaWC) based at 
Loughborough University (http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc). 
iii The author deliberately chooses to omit Northern Ireland, where despite the devolved power 
sharing Executive currently lying dormant, it would be argued that the institutional settlement 
remains settled – unlike in England. 
iv This is not, however, a terminal blow to the NRP given that although the regional project 
was dealt a heavy blow in the North East referendum, it is clear that in certain quarters – 
especially HM Treasury – regions continue to occupy the attention of political and economic 
strategists involved in promoting economic growth and the restructuring of the state 
architecture in England. While one group of reformers, led by the government ministers Ruth 
Kelly and David Milliband and the centre-left IPPR think-tank, are pushing the city-region 
agenda hard, another group that brings together the economist Ed Balls and John Healey 
(from HM Treasury) alongside the New Local Government Network think-tank, are seeking to 
re-empower the existing regions.  
v Ken Livingstone was the former leader of the Greater London Council that was famously 
dissolved by Margaret Thatcher in 1986. 
vi These were the Thames Gateway, Milton Keynes & South Midlands, Ashford, and London-
Stansted-Cambridge-Peterborough. 
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vii At the time, John Adams was Research Director at the Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR) North, a centre-left political think-tank. 
viii Strategy development in the South West and East of England is very interesting given that 
both initiatives focus specifically on their own region, and do not traverse regional boundaries. 
While this does not make their strategies trans-regional, they do highlight the importance of 
trans-regional flows to regional development. 
ix As Ward and Jonas (2004: 2126) rightly argue, each of these positions “precludes counter-
arguments to the effect that national states must fundamentally be self-interested in ensuring 
that city-regions in their territories continue to generate growth, jobs, wealth, and tax 
revenue”. 
x This equates to a mere 0.001% of total public expenditure in the North of England. 
xi In the case of Central Lancashire, the fact that it was not a city-region did not prevent them 
from latching onto the notion of how polycentric city-regions have been successful in other 
regions to successfully convince policymakers that they warranted a place within the Northern 
Way. 
